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RECENT DEVELOPMENT 
MCNEAL V. STATE: THE COURT OF APPEALS OF 
MARYLAND INTERPRETED PRICE V. STATE TO ALLOW 
ILLOGICAL OR FACTUALLY INCONSISTENT JURY 
VERDICTS IN CRIMINAL TRIALS, BUT HELD THAT 
LEGALLY INCONSISTENT JURY VERDICTS ARE 
IMPERMISSIBLE. 
By: Nicholas E. Kosmas 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that while a legally 
inconsistent jury verdict is prohibited, a factually inconsistent one is not a 
reversible error. McNeal v. State, 426 Md. 455, 44 A.3d 982 (2012). 
Specifically, the court drew a distinction between legally and factually 
inconsistent verdicts in criminal trials when it upheld a jury verdict that 
found the defendant guilty of possession of a regulated firearm, but not 
guilty of wearing, carrying, or transporting a handgun. Id. 
On October 15, 2008, four Baltimore City police officers approached 
David McNeal ("McNeal") while he was standing on the sidewalk. The 
officers asked McNeal if he had "anything he shouldn't have," at which 
point McNeal revealed that he had a handgun in his pants pocket. The 
officers arrested McNeal and charged him with unlawful possession of a 
firearm after prior conviction of a disqualifying crime, wearing, carrying, 
or transporting a handgun, and resisting arrest. At his trial in the Circuit 
Court for Baltimore City, the jury found McNeal guilty of the possession 
charge, but not guilty of wearing, carrying, or transporting a handgun. 
McNeal's objection that the verdict was inconsistent and that it should go 
back to the jury was denied. 
McNeal appealed to the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland. A 
three-judge panel vacated the sentence for resisting arrest, but affirmed 
the remainder of his convictions. The intermediate appellate court relied 
on Price v. State in affirming the factually inconsistent verdicts. 
Specifically, the McNeal court agreed with the concurring opinion in 
Price that found a factually inconsistent or illogical verdict should be 
allowed as a jury's conclusions of fact, not law. Subsequently, McNeal 
petitioned for a writ of certiorari with the Court of Appeals of Maryland, 
asking the court to clarify if Price applied to both logically inconsistent 
and legally inconsistent verdicts. The Court of Appeals of Maryland 
granted McNeal's petition. 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland began its analysis by reviewing the 
holding in Price v. State. McNeal, 426 Md. at 462-63,44 A.3d at 986-87. 
96 
2012] McNeal v. State 97 
In Price, police officers observed what they thought was Leonard Price 
selling drugs. McNeal, 426 Md. at 462, 44 A.3d at 986 (citing Price v. 
State, 405 Md. 10, 12-13,949 A.2d 619, 621 (2008». The police arrested 
Price and discovered that he was carrying cash and a handgun. McNeal, 
426 Md. at 462, 44 A.3d at 987 (citing Price, 405 Md. at 13,949 A.2d at 
621). Price was subsequently charged with eighteen counts of drug and 
firearm offenses, including possession of a firearm during and in relation 
to a drug trafficking crime. McNeal, 426 Md. at 463,44 A.3d 987 (citing 
Price, 405 Md. at 13-14,949 A.2d at 621-22). Prior to deliberations, the 
trial judge instructed the jury that they could convict Price on the charge 
of possession of a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking 
crime only if they found him guilty of one of the drug trafficking charges. 
McNeal, 426 Md. at 463, 44 A.3d 987 (citing Price, 405 Md. at 14, 949 
A.2d at 622). The jury ignored the judge's instruction and acquitted Price 
on the drug trafficking charges, but found him guilty of possession of a 
firearm during a drug trafficking crime. McNeal, 426 Md. at 463, 44 
A.3d 987 (citing Price, 405 Md. at 15, 949 A.2d at 622). 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland reversed and held that legally 
inconsistent jury verdicts are not permissible in Maryland criminal trials. 
McNeal, 426 Md. at 465,44 A.3d at 988 (citing Price, 405 Md. at 34, 949 
A.2d at 633). Judge Harrell, in his concurring opinion in Price, drew a 
distinction between legally inconsistent and factually inconsistent jury 
verdicts. McNeal, 426 Md. at 466, 44 A.3d at 988 (citing Price, 405 Md. 
at 35, 949 A.2d at 634 (Harrell, J., concurring». Judge Harrell argued 
that while a legally inconsistent verdict requires a jury to ignore a judge's 
instructions on how to apply the law, a factually inconsistent verdict 
could come from many sources, any of which would require a court to 
delve into jury deliberations in order to reverse. McNeal, 426 Md. at 466, 
44 A.3d at 988 (citing Price, 405 Md. at 36, 949 A.2d at 635 (Harrell, J., 
concurring) ). 
After discussing Price, the court proceeded to review how other 
jurisdictions addressed factually inconsistent criminal jury verdicts. 
McNeal, 426 Md. at 467, 44 A.3d at 989. Florida, New York, Missouri, 
Rhode Island, Massachusetts, and Iowa all allow a jury to reach illogical 
factual conclusions, provided that they are consistent with judicial 
instruction and the law. Id. at 467-68, 44 A.3d at 989-90. Only Alaska 
rejects both factually and legally inconsistent verdicts. Id. at 468, 44 
A.3d at 990. 
The court then considered two of McNeal's arguments for reversal. 
McNeal, 426 Md. at 469-72, 44 AJd at 991-92. First, the court 
considered and dismissed McNeal's claim that collateral estoppel 
prevented the conviction, reasoning that if McNeal had been tried 
separately for each charge, collateral estoppel may apply, but since he 
was tried for both crimes in the same trial, it does not. Id. Second, the 
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court rejected McNeal's argument that the Court of Appeals of Maryland 
has already held that factually inconsistent verdicts are prohibited in 
Williams v. State, noting that Williams was a bench trial and only juries 
are given deference when it comes to inconsistent verdicts. McNeal, 426 
Md. at 470, 44 A.3d at 991 (citing Williams v. State, 397 Md. 172, 189-
90,916 A.2d 294,305 (2007)). 
Finally, the court analyzed two important features of a criminal jury. 
McNeal, 426 Md. at 471-72,44 A.3d at 992. First, the court emphasized 
that the jury has the role of fact-finding in a criminal trial. Id. at 471,44 
A.3d at 992. As such, if a judge properly instructs the jury on the law, it 
is up to the jury alone to decide how to apply the facts to that instruction. 
!d. Because the State charged McNeal with two crimes that contained 
separate and distinct legal elements, the court reasoned that it is legally 
possible and permissible for the jury to convict him of one but not the 
other. Id. 
The court also acknowledged that juries sometimes exercise leniency 
through their verdicts. McNeal, 426 Md. at 472, 44 A.3d at 992. 
Although the court emphasized that this is not the primary function of a 
criminal jury, it reasoned that preventing such outcomes would require 
more stringent judicial instruction that could improperly influence the 
jury. Id. at 471-72, 44 A.3d at 992. Also, the court pointed out that juries 
often engage in compromise and negotiation. Id. at 471, 44 A.3d at 992. 
Concerned with disturbing a verdict for the wrong reasons, the court 
refused to look into the minds of the jurors and concluded that McNeal's 
factually inconsistent verdict was permissible. Id. at 473, 44 A.3d at 993. 
In McNeal, the Court of Appeals of Maryland adopted the concurring 
opinion in Price and articulated a distinction between legally inconsistent 
and factually inconsistent verdicts. In doing so, the court preserved the 
right of a jury to apply the facts as it sees fit in a criminal trial, provided 
that the verdict fits the judge's instructions as to the law. As a result of 
this holding, defense attorneys may find the State hesitant to drop related 
charges because a jury, that follows the judge's instructions, may pick 
and choose which charges to convict on regardless of whether the verdict 
is logical. Practitioners should carefully examine the elements of the 
charges with the understanding that while it may not seem logical, if the 
elements are separate and distinct, the jury may exercise leniency and 
find a defendant guilty of one offense but not another. 
